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The possibility of a science of experience: An examination of some conceptual problems facing the study of consciousness
Author(s) -
Valentine Elizabeth R.
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
british journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.536
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 2044-8295
pISSN - 0007-1269
DOI - 10.1348/000712699161611
Subject(s) - psychology , consciousness , subjectivity , objectification , social psychology , perspective (graphical) , clarity , natural (archaeology) , confusion , attribution , cognitive psychology , epistemology , psychoanalysis , neuroscience , philosophy , biochemistry , chemistry , archaeology , artificial intelligence , computer science , history
This paper addresses some of the chief conceptual problems associated with the study of conscious experience. (1) Conceptual confusion and lack of clarity of the term ‘consciousness’ itself, including doubts as to whether it constitutes a natural kind, and confusion between different types. (2) Privacy: the claim that conscious experience cannot be studied scientifically on account of its subjectivity. The distinction between subjective and objective is re‐examined and the universally inferential nature of scientific statements stressed. Methods for the study of pain are examined in detail, exemplifying the objectification of a prototypically subjective experience. (3) Epiphenomenalism: the view that an adequate account of mental life can be given without reference to consciousness because the latter plays no causal role in the control of behaviour. The primacy of conscious experience is stressed as is its centrality to mental health. It is concluded that the study of conscious experience is both possible, even if from a third person perspective and necessary, on account of its importance for psychological well‐being.