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Testing two mechanisms by which rational and irrational beliefs may affect the functionality of inferences
Author(s) -
Bond Frank W.,
Dryden Windy,
Briscoe Rachel
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
british journal of medical psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.102
H-Index - 62
eISSN - 2044-8341
pISSN - 0007-1129
DOI - 10.1348/000711299160121
Subject(s) - irrational number , affect (linguistics) , psychology , social psychology , emotive , proposition , epistemology , philosophy , mathematics , geometry , communication
This article describes a role playing experiment that examined the sufficiency hypothesis of Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT). This proposition states that it is sufficient for rational and irrational beliefs to refer to preferences and musts, respectively, if those beliefs are to affect the functionality of inferences (FI). Consistent with the REBT literature (e.g. Dryden, 1994; Dryden & Ellis, 1988; Palmer, Dryden, Ellis & Yapp, 1995) results from this experiment showed that rational and irrational beliefs, as defined by REBT, do affect FI. Specifically, results showed that people who hold a rational belief form inferences that are significantly more functional than those that are formed by people who hold an irrational belief. Contrary to REBT theory, the sufficiency hypothesis was not supported. Thus, results indicated that it is not sufficient for rational and irrational beliefs to refer to preferences and musts, respectively, if those beliefs are to affect the FI. It appears, then, that preferences and musts are not sufficient mechanisms by which rational and irrational beliefs, respectively, affect the FI. Psychotherapeutic implications of these findings are considered.