Open AccessDormant Dispositions, Agent Value, and the Trinity
Author(s) -
Samuel Lebens,
Dale Tuggy
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
the journal of analytic theology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2330-2380
DOI - 10.12978/jat.2019-7.180004110424
Subject(s) - theism , philosophy , argument (complex analysis) , denial , argumentation theory , corollary , epistemology , value (mathematics) , variety (cybernetics) , psychology , psychoanalysis , biology , computer science , biochemistry , mathematics , machine learning , artificial intelligence , pure mathematics
In this paper we argue that the moral value of an agent is determined solely by their dispositions to act intentionally and freely. We then put this conclusion to work. It resolves a putative moral paradox first posed by Saul Smilansky, and it undermines a prominent line of argument for a variety of Trinitarian theology. Finally, we derive our conclusion about the moral worth of agents not only from our initial series of thought experiments, but also from Abrahamic theism itself. This means that Smilansky’s paradox can only possibly be rehabilitated by an atheist, and that the aforementioned line of argumentation for the Trinity is radically self-undermining, since it relies upon the denial of a corollary of Abrahamic theism.