
THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL PRACTICE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE WORLD CONTEXT
Author(s) -
Виктор Момотов,
Виктор Момотов
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
žurnal zarubežnogo zakonodatelʹstva i sravnitelʹnogo pravovedeniâ
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2587-9995
pISSN - 1991-3222
DOI - 10.12737/article_59bbac1c6741c2.52388894
Subject(s) - law , legal realism , statutory law , legal opinion , political science , empirical legal studies , legal history , legal profession , legal research , legal science , comparative law , supreme court , legal positivism , private law , black letter law
In Russian legal science there is a wide-spread belief according to which legal precedents are not sources of Russian law, because Russian legal system forms a part of continental legal system. Various researchers believe that judicial practice does not contain legal norms and consequently case law is not a component of Russian legal framework.
The present paper contains the theoretical and historical legal research of the place and role of case law in Anglo-American and continental legal systems. It’s shown that for long historical periods legal precedents were recognized as sources of law not only in Great Britain and the USA, but also in major European legal systems, while at the present time differentiation of legal systems with respect to their attitude towards case law is becoming outdated. Furthermore, based on the research of various legal scholars’ traditions (principally of the positivistic and the sociological traditions) this article demonstrates that negative attitude towards case law is largely determined by the formalistic and obsolete understanding of the term ”source of law”, coming from the misinterpretation of positivism.
The paper also presents the current development trends of case law as a source of law. In particular the article outlines the proactive interpretations of new statutory provisions issued by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the global uniqueness of such interpretations and the influence of scientific–technological progress and public needs on the highest court’s interpretations. The mutual interference of case law and statutory law is shown.