Open AccessPopper and Free Will
Author(s) -
Danny Frederick
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
studia philosophica estonica/studia philosophica estonica.
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2228-110X
pISSN - 1736-5899
DOI - 10.12697/spe.2010.3.1.02
Subject(s) - indeterminism , free will , determinism , epistemology , action (physics) , compatibilism , rationality , consciousness , philosophy , incompatibilism , physics , quantum mechanics
Determinism seems incompatible with free will. However, even indeterminism seems incompatible with free will, since it seems to make free actions random. Popper contends that free agents are not bound by physical laws, even indeterministic ones, and that undetermined actions are not random if they are influenced by abstract entities. I argue that Popper could strengthen his account by drawing upon his theories of propensities and of limited rationality; but that even then his account would not fully explain why free actions are not random. I offer a solution to this problem which draws on Hornsby's analysis of action. I then borrow an idea of Kant about self-consciousness to distinguish free agents from sub-human animals. I make a brief evaluation of Popper's contribution.