
There are vague objects (in any sense in which there are ordinary objects)
Author(s) -
Jiri Benovsky
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
studia philosophica estonica/studia philosophica estonica.
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2228-110X
pISSN - 1736-5899
DOI - 10.12697/spe.2008.1.3.01
Subject(s) - sense (electronics) , metaphysics , object (grammar) , epistemology , mathematics , computer science , philosophy , artificial intelligence , engineering , electrical engineering
Ordinary objects are vague, because either (i) composition is restricted, or (ii) there really are no such objects (but we still want to talk about them), or (iii) because such objects are not metaphysically (independently of us) distinguishable from other 'extra-ordinary' objects. In any sense in which there are ordinary objects, they are vague.