Open AccessDeflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism
Author(s) -
Massimiliano Vignolo
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
studia philosophica estonica/studia philosophica estonica.
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2228-110X
pISSN - 1736-5899
DOI - 10.12697/spe.2008.1.1.05
Subject(s) - denial , meaning (existential) , epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , psychology , psychoanalysis , medicine
I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception of meaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that deflationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism.