Open AccessDeterminants of diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic information selection
Author(s) -
Markellos Tsiourpas,
Frederic Vallee Tourangeau,
Panos Kordoutis
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
psychologia: to periodiko tīs ellīnikīs psychologikīs etaireias/psychologia. to periodiko tīs ellīnikīs psychologikīs etaireias
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2732-6640
pISSN - 1106-5737
DOI - 10.12681/psy_hps.23751
Subject(s) - inference , salience (neuroscience) , action selection , selection (genetic algorithm) , action (physics) , semantic reasoner , task (project management) , computer science , psychology , cognitive psychology , artificial intelligence , perception , physics , management , quantum mechanics , neuroscience , economics
Pseudodiagnosticity refers to the tendency to select impoverished information in preference to equally available diagnostic data. Mynatt, Doherty, and Dragan (1993) reported that pseudodiagnostic reasoning was attenuated in problems in which the information selection had consequences for the reasoner’s future actions in contrast to problemsin which it did not. Girotto, Evans and Legrenzi (1996) denied that such “action” problems fostered better information selection because they argued that in Mynatt’s et al.’s study action and non-action or inferencevaried in how the decision task was framed. It was predicted that for action problems there will be a higher frequency in informative data selection vs. both inference problems. In addition to that, a primacy effect for inference problems would occur irrespective of sequence of data presentation but not for action problems. We re-examined the way people reasoned about action problems and inference problems taking into consideration Girotto et al.’s criticisms. We found that even when the presentation and salience of the information was equated in both kinds of problems, diagnostic information selection was more likely foraction that for inference problems.