How the Second-Order Free Rider Problem Is Solved in a Small-Scale Society | Zendy

Sarah Mathew | Zendy

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How the Second-Order Free Rider Problem Is Solved in a Small-Scale Society

Author(s) -

Sarah Mathew

Publication year - 2017

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.p20171090

Subject(s) - punitive damages , punishment (psychology) , free rider problem , order (exchange) , vignette , population , free riding , economics , law and economics , criminology , social psychology , public good , sociology , law , political science , psychology , microeconomics , demography , finance , incentive

Moralistic punishment enables human cooperation, but an outstanding question is why people voluntarily sanction when they can obtain the benefits of punishment without being enforcers themselves. To address how decentralized societies solve this second-order free rider issue, I examine why people punish among the Turkana, a population in Kenya in which informal peer sanctioning sustains participation in high-stakes interethnic warfare. Using vignette experiments I show that Turkana subjects express punitive sentiments toward second-order free riders and those who sanction irresponsibly. The prevalence of such meta norms regulating punishment reveal a possible pathway by which moralistic punishment could have evolved.

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