Multidimensional Platform Design
Author(s) -
André Veiga,
E. Glen Weyl,
Alexander White
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
american economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936
H-Index - 297
eISSN - 1944-7981
pISSN - 0002-8282
DOI - 10.1257/aer.p20171044
Subject(s) - monetization , centrality , sorting , value (mathematics) , computer science , state (computer science) , microeconomics , network effect , economics , human–computer interaction , mathematics , algorithm , combinatorics , machine learning , macroeconomics , programming language
Successful platforms attract not just many users, but also those of the right kind. 'The right kind of user' is one who can either be directly monetized or who differentially attracts other valuable users. Bonacich centrality on the network of user sorting with direct value of monetization captures this feedback loop and thus characterizes the value of user characteristics. We use this value to determine optimal steady-state platform design and reliable means for platforms to reach such a steady state. We apply these results respectively to explain the dynamic growth strategy of social networks and urban development policies of cities.
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