Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match | Zendy

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu | Zendy; Parag A. Pathak | Zendy; Alvin E. Roth | Zendy

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Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

Author(s) -

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu,

Parag A. Pathak,

Alvin E. Roth

Publication year - 2009

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.99.5.1954

Subject(s) - inefficiency , matching (statistics) , incentive , stability (learning theory) , field (mathematics) , microeconomics , economics , school choice , computer science , mathematics , market economy , statistics , machine learning , pure mathematics

The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school -- single tiebreaking -- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21)

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