Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences | Zendy

Alvin E. Roth | Zendy; Tayfun Sönmez | Zendy; M. Utku Ünver | Zendy

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Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences

Author(s) -

Alvin E. Roth,

Tayfun Sönmez,

M. Utku Ünver

Publication year - 2007

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.97.3.828

Subject(s) - coincidence , kidney , microeconomics , economics , compatibility (geochemistry) , monetary economics , medicine , pathology , materials science , alternative medicine , composite material

Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.

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