Reciprocity in Groups and the Limits to Social Capital

Robert Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation” (Putnam 1995: 67). Such networks are typically associated with norms that promote coordination, cooperation and reciprocity for the mutual benefit of network members. These norms, coupled with the appropriate use of sanctions in case of noncompliance, are often thought to enable these groups to deal smoothly and effectively with multiple social and economic issues. At the same time, some authors have noted that strongly bonded groups may have adverse consequences for others (see, for instance Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landolt, 1996) or even for themselves (see for instance George Akerlof, 1976, or Kaushik Basu, 1986). It is this latter aspect that we wish to emphasize in these notes.