Decision-Making Procedures for Committees of Careerist Experts | Zendy

Gilat Levy | Zendy

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Decision-Making Procedures for Committees of Careerist Experts

Author(s) -

Gilat Levy

Publication year - 2007

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.97.2.306

Subject(s) - transparency (behavior) , voting , accountability , information aggregation , predictability , economics , politics , yield (engineering) , public relations , private information retrieval , public economics , public administration , accounting , law and economics , political science , law , computer science , physics , materials science , computer security , quantum mechanics , metallurgy , data mining

The article focuses on the effect of transparency of committees on committee member voting. Proponents of transparency emphasize the benefits of enhanced accountability and predictability, as well as the provision of expert information to the economy. Political scientists and economists both note that transparency can yield inefficient decisions as decision makers start hiding their private views in public. This would distort the process of information aggregation. The article also states that committee members would vote depending on the popular sentiment concerning the decision, rather than what they feel is right or wrong.

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