Designing Efficient Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games | Zendy

Susan Athey | Zendy; Ilya Segal | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Designing Efficient Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games

Author(s) -

Susan Athey,

Ilya Segal

Publication year - 2007

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.97.2.131

Subject(s) - economics , incentive compatibility , private information retrieval , mechanism design , incentive , microeconomics , mathematical economics , consumption (sociology) , bayesian probability , rational expectations , mechanism (biology) , bayesian game , econometrics , computer science , sequential game , game theory , artificial intelligence , social science , philosophy , computer security , epistemology , sociology

This paper studies the problem of allocating a good between two players in each period of an infinite-horizon game. The players' valuations in each period are private information, and the valuations change over time. We analyze two special cases for the dynamics of valuations: "serially correlated valuations," where players' valuations are exogenous but serially correlated; and "learning by doing," where a player's past consumption improves his current distribution of valuations, but his valuations are otherwise uncorrelated. We analyze conditions under which there exists an efficient, Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC), individually rational (IR), budget-balanced (BB) mechanism, when the mechanism designer has commitment power. We consider

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research