Open AccessAgents With and Without Principals
Author(s) -
Marianne Bertrand,
Sendhil Mullainathan
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
american economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936
H-Index - 297
eISSN - 1944-7981
pISSN - 0002-8282
DOI - 10.1257/aer.90.2.203
Subject(s) - shareholder , incentive , moral hazard , principal (computer security) , relevance (law) , face (sociological concept) , compensation (psychology) , set (abstract data type) , economics , principal–agent problem , microeconomics , executive compensation , business , actuarial science , law and economics , finance , corporate governance , law , sociology , political science , social psychology , psychology , social science , programming language , computer science , operating system
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