From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws | Zendy

Gabriele Gratton | Zendy; Luigi Guiso | Zendy; Claudio Michelacci | Zendy; Massimo Morelli | Zendy

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From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws

Author(s) -

Gabriele Gratton,

Luigi Guiso,

Claudio Michelacci,

Massimo Morelli

Publication year - 2021

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.20190672

Subject(s) - bureaucracy , politics , reputation , incentive , economics , legislation , state (computer science) , law , law and economics , market economy , political science , algorithm , computer science

With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency. (JEL D72, D73)

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