Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence | Zendy

Marianne Bertrand | Zendy; Matilde Bombardini | Zendy; Raymond Fisman | Zendy; Francesco Trebbi | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence

Author(s) -

Marianne Bertrand,

Matilde Bombardini,

Raymond Fisman,

Francesco Trebbi

Publication year - 2020

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.20180615

Subject(s) - politics , subsidy , political action , economics , corporate tax , point (geometry) , public economics , corporate social responsibility , action (physics) , accounting , political economy , political science , market economy , tax avoidance , public relations , law , tax reform , physics , geometry , mathematics , quantum mechanics

We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large US corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the strategic use of political action committee (PAC) spending. Our estimates imply that 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC contributions and 35 percent of federal lobbying. Absent of disclosure requirements, charitable giving may be a form of corporate political influence undetected by voters and subsidized by taxpayers. (JEL D22, D64, D72, L31)

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research