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Regulation by Shaming: Deterrence Effects of Publicizing Violations of Workplace Safety and Health Laws
Author(s) -
Matthew S. Johnson
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
american economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936
H-Index - 297
eISSN - 1944-7981
pISSN - 0002-8282
DOI - 10.1257/aer.20180501
Subject(s) - compliance (psychology) , deterrence theory , incentive , business , occupational safety and health , workplace safety , deterrence (psychology) , actuarial science , administration (probate law) , public relations , law , economics , law and economics , political science , psychology , social psychology , microeconomics
Publicizing firms' socially undesirable actions may enhance firms' incentives to avoid such actions. In 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) began issuing press releases about facilities that violated safety and health regulations. Using quasi-random variation arising from a cutoff rule OSHA followed, I find that publicizing a facility's violations led other facilities to substantially improve their compliance and experience fewer occupational injuries. OSHA would need to conduct 210 additional inspections to achieve the same improvement in compliance as achieved with a single press release. Evidence suggests that employers improve compliance to avoid costly responses from workers.

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