Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services | Zendy

Nava Ashraf | Zendy; Oriana Bandiera | Zendy; EDWARD J. DAVENPORT | Zendy; Scott S. Lee | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services

Author(s) -

Nava Ashraf,

Oriana Bandiera,

EDWARD J. DAVENPORT,

Scott S. Lee

Publication year - 2020

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.20180326

Subject(s) - prosocial behavior , altruism (biology) , productivity , selection (genetic algorithm) , marketing , business , sorting , psychology , position (finance) , labour economics , public relations , economics , economic growth , social psychology , political science , finance , artificial intelligence , computer science , programming language

We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for nurses in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. We randomize the offer of career benefits at the recruitment stage. In line with common wisdom, treatment attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off only exists at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally pro-social. These are hired, and they perform better at every step of the chain: they deliver more services, promote institutional childbirth, and reduce child malnutrition by 25% in the communities they serve.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research