Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship | Zendy

Drew Fudenberg | Zendy; Luis Rayo | Zendy

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Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship

Author(s) -

Drew Fudenberg,

Luis Rayo

Publication year - 2019

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.20171939

Subject(s) - apprenticeship , principal (computer security) , task (project management) , cash , work (physics) , training (meteorology) , economics , labour economics , knowledge transfer , microeconomics , computer science , business , knowledge management , finance , management , engineering , mechanical engineering , philosophy , linguistics , physics , meteorology , operating system

A principal specifies time paths of effort provision, task allocation, and knowledge transfer for a cash-constrained apprentice, who is free to walk away at any time. In the optimal contract the apprentice pays for training by working for low or no wages and by working inefficiently hard. The apprentice can work on both knowledge-complementary and knowledge-independent tasks. We study the optimal time path of effort distortions and their impact on the knowledge transfer, and analyze the effect of regulatory limits on the length of apprenticeships and on how much effort apprentices are allowed to provide. (JEL D82, D86, J24, J41, M53)

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