Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment | Zendy

David K. Levine | Zendy; Andrea Mattozzi | Zendy

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Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

Author(s) -

David K. Levine,

Andrea Mattozzi

Publication year - 2020

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.20170476

Subject(s) - punishment (psychology) , comparative statics , enforcement , voting , turnout , economics , politics , voter turnout , microeconomics , public economics , political science , law , social psychology , psychology

We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.

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