An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment | Zendy

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An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

Author(s) -

Noriaki Okamoto

Publication year - 2018

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.20160970

Subject(s) - vickrey auction , vickrey–clarke–groves auction , proxy bid , english auction , auction theory , revenue equivalence , bidding , economics , generalized second price auction , mathematical economics , unique bid auction , counterexample , microeconomics , mathematics , combinatorics

Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. (JEL D44)

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