Hayek, Local Information, and Commanding Heights: Decentralizing State-Owned Enterprises in China
Author(s) -
Zhangkai Huang,
Lixing Li,
Guangrong Ma,
Lixin Colin Xu
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
american economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936
H-Index - 297
eISSN - 1944-7981
pISSN - 0002-8282
DOI - 10.1257/aer.20150592
Subject(s) - decentralization , china , agency (philosophy) , government (linguistics) , business , central government , state (computer science) , industrial organization , key (lock) , economic system , state ownership , local government , market economy , economics , public administration , political science , computer science , philosophy , linguistics , computer security , algorithm , law , epistemology
Hayek (1945) argues that local information is key to understanding the efficiency of alternative economic systems and whether production should be centralized or decentralized. The Chinese experience of decentralizing SOEs confirms this insight: when the distance to the government is farther, the SOE is more likely to be decentralized, and this distance-decentralization link is more pronounced with higher communication costs and greater firm-performance heterogeneity. However, when the Chinese central government oversees SOEs in strategic industries, the distance-decentralization link is muted. We also consider alternative agency-cost-based explanations, and do not find much support. (JEL D22, D83, L25, L32, L33, O14, P31)
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