Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector | Zendy

Mark Egan | Zendy; Alı Hortaçsu | Zendy; Gregor Matvos | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector

Author(s) -

Mark Egan,

Alı Hortaçsu,

Gregor Matvos

Publication year - 2016

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.20150342

Subject(s) - deposit insurance , economics , financial fragility , competition (biology) , fragility , bank run , monetary economics , capital (architecture) , capital requirement , financial distress , empirical evidence , bank failure , financial system , financial crisis , finance , macroeconomics , microeconomics , market liquidity , history , ecology , philosophy , chemistry , archaeology , epistemology , incentive , biology

PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE, PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION. We develop and estimate an empirical model of the U.S. banking sector using a new data set covering the largest U.S. banks over the period 2002-2013. Our model incorporates insured depositors and run-prone uninsured depositors who have rich preferences over dierentiated banks. Banks compete for deposits in the spirit of Matutes and Vives (1996) and can endogenously default. We estimate demand for uninsured

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research