Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction | Zendy

Jonathan Levin | Zendy; Andrzej Skrzypacz | Zendy

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Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Author(s) -

Jonathan Levin,

Andrzej Skrzypacz

Publication year - 2016

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.20141212

Subject(s) - combinatorial auction , economics , spectrum auction , vickrey auction , mathematical economics , common value auction , auction theory , vickrey–clarke–groves auction , microeconomics , range (aeronautics) , generalized second price auction , unique bid auction , revenue equivalence , engineering , aerospace engineering

The combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.

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