An Empirical Model of the Medical Match | Zendy

Nikhil Agarwal | Zendy

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An Empirical Model of the Medical Match

Author(s) -

Nikhil Agarwal

Publication year - 2015

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.20131006

Subject(s) - economics , matching (statistics) , counterfactual thinking , allegation , pairwise comparison , econometrics , salary , microeconomics , stability (learning theory) , product market , preference , product (mathematics) , statistics , mathematics , computer science , market economy , philosophy , geometry , epistemology , political science , law , incentive , machine learning

This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries.

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