Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide | Zendy

Christopher Mayer | Zendy; Edward R. Morrison | Zendy; Tomasz Piskorski | Zendy; Arpit Gupta | Zendy

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Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide

Author(s) -

Christopher Mayer,

Edward R. Morrison,

Tomasz Piskorski,

Arpit Gupta

Publication year - 2014

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.104.9.2830

Subject(s) - settlement (finance) , corporation , government (linguistics) , economics , exploit , juvenile delinquency , monetary economics , finance , business , psychology , linguistics , philosophy , computer security , psychiatry , computer science , payment

We investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage modification programs. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in modification policy induced by settlement of US state government lawsuits against Countrywide Financial Corporation, which agreed to offer modifications to seriously delinquent borrowers. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that Countrywide's monthly delinquency rate increased more than 0.54 percentage points—a 10 percent relative increase—immediately after the settlement's announcement. The estimated increase in default rates is largest among borrowers least likely to default otherwise. These results suggest that strategic behavior should be an important consideration in designing mortgage modification programs. (JEL D14, G21, K22, R31)

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