Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps | Zendy

Eduardo Perez-Richet | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps

Author(s) -

Eduardo Perez-Richet

Publication year - 2014

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.104.5.469

Subject(s) - communication source , persuasion , interim , computer science , set (abstract data type) , bayesian probability , type (biology) , bayesian inference , mathematical economics , artificial intelligence , psychology , social psychology , political science , mathematics , telecommunications , ecology , law , biology , programming language

This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional information structure for the receiver from a possibly restricted feasible set. I suggest a solution to this game that takes into account the signaling potential of the sender's choice

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research