How University Endowments Respond to Financial Market Shocks: Evidence and Implications
Author(s) -
Jeffrey R. Brown,
Stephen G. Dimmock,
JunKoo Kang,
Scott J. Weisbenner
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
american economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936
H-Index - 297
eISSN - 1944-7981
pISSN - 0002-8282
DOI - 10.1257/aer.104.3.931
Subject(s) - hoarding (animal behavior) , endowment , economics , value (mathematics) , revenue , endowment effect , monetary economics , finance , microeconomics , foraging , ecology , philosophy , epistemology , machine learning , computer science , biology
Endowment payouts have become an increasingly important component of universities' revenues in recent decades. We test two leading theories of endowment payouts: (1) universities smooth endowment payouts, or (2) universities use endowments as self-insurance against financial shocks. In contrast to both theories, endowments actively reduce payouts relative to their stated payout policies following negative, but not positive, shocks. This asymmetric behavior is consistent with "endowment hoarding," especially among endowments with values close to the benchmark value at the start of the university president's tenure. We also document the effect of negative endowment shocks on university operations, including personnel cuts.
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