Optimal Pension Systems with Simple Instruments
Author(s) -
Mikhail Golosov,
Ali Shourideh,
Maxim Troshkin,
Aleh Tsyvinski
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
american economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936
H-Index - 297
eISSN - 1944-7981
pISSN - 0002-8282
DOI - 10.1257/aer.103.3.502
Subject(s) - stylized fact , pension , economics , context (archaeology) , simple (philosophy) , welfare , work (physics) , social security , set (abstract data type) , pension system , social welfare , microeconomics , actuarial science , macroeconomics , computer science , finance , engineering , market economy , mechanical engineering , paleontology , philosophy , epistemology , biology , programming language , law , political science
We analyze optimal pension systems relying on simple policy instruments in a lifecycle environment which admits endogenous decisions of how much to work as well as when to retire. The optimality in this context means the highest welfare that can be achieved within a restricted set of instruments, while keeping the total cost of the pension system unchanged. The policy instruments we consider are the optimized retirement benefit functions modeled after a stylized version of the current US Social Security.
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