Inferring Strategic Voting | Zendy

Kei Kawai | Zendy; Yasutora Watanabe | Zendy

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Inferring Strategic Voting

Author(s) -

Kei Kawai,

Yasutora Watanabe

Publication year - 2013

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.103.2.624

Subject(s) - voting , cardinal voting systems , economics , econometrics , disapproval voting , estimator , bullet voting , ranked voting system , approval voting , first past the post voting , anti plurality voting , microeconomics , political science , statistics , mathematics , politics , law

We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction (63.4 percent, 84.9 percent) of strategic voters, only a small fraction (1.4 percent, 4.2 percent) of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies

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