But Who Will Monitor the Monitor? | Zendy

David Rahman | Zendy

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But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?

Author(s) -

David Rahman

Publication year - 2012

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.102.6.2767

Subject(s) - incentive , enforcement , context (archaeology) , microeconomics , private information retrieval , economics , business , computer science , computer security , political science , law , paleontology , biology

Suppose that providing incentives for a group of individuals in a strategic context requires a monitor to detect their deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? To address this question, I propose a contract that makes the monitor responsible for monitoring, and thereby provides incentives even when the monitor's observations are not only private, but costly, too. I also characterize exactly when such a contract can provide monitors with the right incentives to perform. In doing so, I emphasize virtual enforcement and suggest its implications for the theory of repeated games. (JEL C78, D23, D82, D86)

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