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Information Processing and Limited Liability
Author(s) -
Bartosz Maćkowiak,
Mirko Wiederholt
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
american economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936
H-Index - 297
eISSN - 1944-7981
pISSN - 0002-8282
DOI - 10.1257/aer.102.3.30
Subject(s) - liability , limited liability , order (exchange) , process (computing) , face (sociological concept) , economics , strict liability , business , actuarial science , microeconomics , computer science , finance , sociology , operating system , social science
Decision-makers often face limited liability and thus know that their loss will be bounded. We study how limited liability affects the behavior of an agent who chooses how much information to acquire and process in order to take a good decision. We find that an agent facing limited liability processes less information than an agent with unlimited liability. The informational gap between the two agents is larger in bad times than in good times and when information is more costly to process.

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