A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel | Zendy

John Asker | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel

Author(s) -

John Asker

Publication year - 2010

Publication title -

american economic review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936

H-Index - 297

eISSN - 1944-7981

pISSN - 0002-8282

DOI - 10.1257/aer.100.3.724

Subject(s) - cartel , damages , bidding , economics , inefficiency , order (exchange) , common value auction , microeconomics , mathematical economics , collusion , law , political science , finance

This paper examines bidding in over 1,700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel (or ring) of stamp dealers in the 1990s. The knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by Daniel Graham, Robert Marshall, and Jean-Francois Richard (1990). Following a reduced form examination of these data, damages, induced inefficiency, and the ring's benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong (2000). A notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers. (JEL D43, D44, L12)

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research