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Belief ascription, metaphor, and intensional identification
Author(s) -
Ballim Afzal,
Wilks Yorick,
Barnden John
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
cognitive science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.498
H-Index - 114
eISSN - 1551-6709
pISSN - 0364-0213
DOI - 10.1207/s15516709cog1501_4
Subject(s) - ascription , extension (predicate logic) , object (grammar) , identification (biology) , proposition , metaphor , computer science , epistemology , relevance (law) , psychology , artificial intelligence , cognitive science , linguistics , philosophy , political science , law , biology , programming language , botany
This article discusses the extension of ViewGen, an algorithm derived for belief ascription, to the areas of intensional object identification and metaphor. ViewGen represents the beliefs of agents as explicit, partitioned proposition sets known as environments. Environments are convenient, even essential, for addressing important pragmatic issues of reasoning. The article concentrates on showing that the transfer of information in metaphors, intensional object identification, and ordinary, nonmetaphorical belief ascription can all be seen as different manifestations of a single environment‐amalgamation process. The article also briefly discusses the extension of ViewGen to speech‐act processing and the addition of a heuristic‐based, relevance‐determination procedure, and justifies the partitioning approach to belief ascription.