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Artifact or Meaningful Theoretical Constructs?: Examining Evidence for Nonbelief‐ and Belief‐Based Attitude Change Processes
Author(s) -
Priester Joseph R.,
Fleming Monique A.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
journal of consumer psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.433
H-Index - 110
eISSN - 1532-7663
pISSN - 1057-7408
DOI - 10.1207/s15327663jcp0601_04
Subject(s) - psychology , attitude change , social psychology , attitude , artifact (error) , cognitive psychology , epistemology , philosophy , neuroscience
Fishbein and Middlestadt (1995) argued that evidence for nonbelief‐based attitude change is primarily artifactual, resulting from inadequate one, belief‐based measurement of attitudes and beliefs. Thus, all attitude change occurs through this process. In this article, we present three arguments in response. First, evidence exists suggesting that some attitude change processes are best conceptualized as relatively nonbelief based. Second, evidence is presented of attitudes resulting from relatively nonbelief‐ and belief‐based attitude change processes, as assessed by the same measure of beliefs within the same study. Third, studies have found substantive and meaningful differences in the attitudes resulting from what are posited to be different attitude change processes. Together, these arguments provide a strong case for the existence and differential consequences of both belief‐ and nonbelief‐based attitude change processes.