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Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts Assess Criminal Responsibility? Lessons from Law and Neuroscience
Author(s) -
Aharoni Eyal,
Funk Chadd,
SinnottArmstrong Walter,
Gazzaniga Michael
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
annals of the new york academy of sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.712
H-Index - 248
eISSN - 1749-6632
pISSN - 0077-8923
DOI - 10.1196/annals.1440.007
Subject(s) - criminal responsibility , neurolaw , agency (philosophy) , psychology , sanity , diminished responsibility , criminal law , sense of agency , neuroethics , cognition , social neuroscience , law , neuroscience , political science , social cognition , criminology , sociology , psychiatry , social science
Can neurological evidence help courts assess criminal responsibility? To answer this question, we must first specify legal criteria for criminal responsibility and then ask how neurological findings can be used to determine whether particular defendants meet those criteria. Cognitive neuroscience may speak to at least two familiar conditions of criminal responsibility: intention and sanity. Functional neuroimaging studies in motor planning, awareness of actions, agency, social contract reasoning, and theory of mind, among others, have recently targeted a small assortment of brain networks thought to be instrumental in such determinations. Advances in each of these areas bring specificity to the problems underlying the application of neuroscience to criminal law.