Open AccessThe Taboo Against Explicit Causal Inference in Nonexperimental Psychology
Author(s) -
Michael P. Grosz,
Julia M. Rohrer,
Felix Thoemmes
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
perspectives on psychological science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 5.234
H-Index - 140
eISSN - 1745-6924
pISSN - 1745-6916
DOI - 10.1177/1745691620921521
Subject(s) - causal inference , inference , taboo , psychology , causal reasoning , relevance (law) , causal model , psychological research , cognitive psychology , epistemology , social psychology , cognition , econometrics , sociology , medicine , philosophy , pathology , neuroscience , anthropology , political science , law , economics
Causal inference is a central goal of research. However, most psychologists refrain from explicitly addressing causal research questions and avoid drawing causal inference on the basis of nonexperimental evidence. We argue that this taboo against causal inference in nonexperimental psychology impairs study design and data analysis, holds back cumulative research, leads to a disconnect between original findings and how they are interpreted in subsequent work, and limits the relevance of nonexperimental psychology for policymaking. At the same time, the taboo does not prevent researchers from interpreting findings as causal effects-the inference is simply made implicitly, and assumptions remain unarticulated. Thus, we recommend that nonexperimental psychologists begin to talk openly about causal assumptions and causal effects. Only then can researchers take advantage of recent methodological advances in causal reasoning and analysis and develop a solid understanding of the underlying causal mechanisms that can inform future research, theory, and policymakers.