Open AccessFive arguments against single state religions
Author(s) -
Bouke de Vries
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
ethnicities
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.721
H-Index - 46
eISSN - 1741-2706
pISSN - 1468-7968
DOI - 10.1177/1468796821989751
Subject(s) - prima facie , argument (complex analysis) , neutrality , state (computer science) , law , population , constitutional right , sociology , political science , law and economics , constitution , biochemistry , chemistry , demography , algorithm , computer science
A significant proportion of states grants constitutional recognition to a single religion, leaving various other religions within society constitutionally unrecognised. Many philosophers believe that this is problematic even when such recognition is (almost) wholly symbolic. The four most common and prima facie plausible objections to what I call ‘mono-recognition’ are that it alienates citizens who do not adhere to the constitutionally recognised religion; that it symbolically subordinates these individuals; that it reinforces oppressive social hierarchies; and that it violates principles of justificatory neutrality. This article shows that none of these objections establish that mono-recognition is wrong within contemporary societies—or even merely pro tanto wrong. However, it goes on to propose a novel argument that does suggest that this type of religious establishment is pro tanto wrong within most societies, if not all. According to this argument, which I refer to as the ‘desire-based objection’, mono-recognition is pro tanto wrong when it fails to accommodate at least some citizens (a) who desire constitutional recognition of their unrecognised religion on morally reasonable, or simply not unreasonable, grounds or who would do so if they were to independently ponder the possibility of receiving such recognition without having to fear any social backlash that receiving it might cause and (b) whose religion is entitled to constitutional recognition based on the size of its population within society; the societal contributions of its members; and any injustices that its members have suffered at the hands of the state or the wider society. As I show, even when one particular religion has the strongest claim to constitutional recognition, this does not normally justify granting sole recognition to it given that the weaker claims of other religions could be accommodated under a system whereby state religions are rotated and recognised for different durations depending on the strength of their claims.