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Against Empathy Bias: The Moral Value of Equitable Empathy
Author(s) -
Zoë Fowler,
Kyle Fiore Law,
Brendan Gaesser
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
psychological science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.641
H-Index - 260
eISSN - 1467-9280
pISSN - 0956-7976
DOI - 10.1177/0956797620979965
Subject(s) - empathy , morality , psychology , feeling , social psychology , simulation theory of empathy , equity (law) , moral development , epistemology , law , political science , philosophy
Empathy has long been considered central to living a moral life. However, mounting evidence has shown that people's empathy is often biased toward (i.e., felt more strongly for) others that they are close or similar to, igniting a debate over whether empathy is inherently morally flawed and should be abandoned in efforts to strive toward greater equity. This debate has focused on whether empathy limits the scope of our morality, but little consideration has been given to whether our moral beliefs may be limiting our empathy. Across two studies conducted on Amazon's Mechanical Turk ( N = 604), we investigated moral judgments of biased and equitable feelings of empathy. We observed a moral preference for empathy toward socially close over distant others. However, feeling equal empathy for all people is seen as the most morally and socially valuable approach. These findings provide new theoretical insight into the relationship between empathy and morality, and they have implications for navigating toward a more egalitarian future.

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