
Double Effect Donation
Author(s) -
Charles C. Camosy,
Joseph Vukov
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
linacre quarterly/the linacre quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.148
H-Index - 9
eISSN - 2050-8549
pISSN - 0024-3639
DOI - 10.1177/0024363921989477
Subject(s) - donation , organ donation , psychology , medicine , social psychology , transplantation , law , political science , surgery
Double Effect Donation claims it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. The reason this act is permissible is that it does not aim at one's own death but rather at saving the lives of others and because saving the lives of others constitutes a proportionately serious reason for engaging in a behavior in which one foresees one's death as the outcome. Double Effect Donation, we argue, opens a novel position in debates surrounding brain death and organ donation and does so without compromising the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life.