
THE METAPHYSICS OF AUGUSTINE AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE CARTESIAN SCIENCE
Author(s) -
William Teixeira
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
cadernos espinosanos/cadernos espinosanos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2447-9012
pISSN - 1413-6651
DOI - 10.11606/issn.2447-9012.espinosa.2017.137402
Subject(s) - metaphysics , epistemology , philosophy , originality , cogito ergo sum , argument (complex analysis) , foundation (evidence) , philosophy of science , sociology , social science , law , qualitative research , biochemistry , chemistry , political science
The aim of this paper is to show to what extent Descartes can be situated within the Augustinian metaphysical tradition and to what extent he has departed from it. To this end, we will argue that Descartes has borrowed his main Meditations’ arguments from Augustine’s philosophy. However, in spite of all factual and textual evidence we will provide against the originality of Descartes’ metaphysical discussions, it will be stressed, on the other hand, that in borrowing not only the cogito argument, but also some general features of his philosophy from Augustine’s works, Descartes intends to frame a metaphysics which will be the ground on his new mechanistic physics. Having this in mind, we will hold that no claim can be put forward against the originality and far-reaching scope of Descartes’ philosophical intentions. Indeed, Descartes’ purpose is to build a new science under a metaphysics, even though this metaphysics is the Augustianian one.