Open AccessTwo versions of the evolutionary debunking arguments and their challenges to moral realism
Author(s) -
Victor Leal
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
filosofia e história da biologia
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2178-6224
pISSN - 1983-053X
DOI - 10.11606/issn.2178-6224v16i1p87-112
Subject(s) - moral realism , epistemology , realism , morality , philosophical realism , counterfactual conditional , contingency , context (archaeology) , moral disengagement , moral psychology , function (biology) , philosophy , sociology , counterfactual thinking , paleontology , evolutionary biology , biology
This paper assesses some challenges posed by evolutionary debunking arguments in Joyce’s function and Street’s contingency versions to moral realism, understood as the metaethical theory according to which there are moral facts that are absolute, universal and context-independent. Some argue that Copp’s society centred realism is untenable given that it cannot support counterfactuals. Shafer-Landau and Huemer’s arguments are also subject to debunking because they cannot persuasively show that human morality is unaffected by evolutionary forces. In Huemer’s view, moral progress is proof of moral facts. It requires moral realism due to progress being context-dependent. From an evolutionary point of view, there are no previous standards and ideals concerning the direction of progress. Finally, a possible answer to the function version of the evolutionary debunking arguments is the possibility that the nature of human language (including moral language) is such that, in essence, it cannot be convincingly divided in language about facts and language about value.