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Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence
Author(s) -
Fassio Davide,
Gao Jie
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/theo.12261
Subject(s) - credence , empirical evidence , context (archaeology) , statistical evidence , rational expectations , proposition , rational agent , econometrics , economics , positive economics , epistemology , mathematics , philosophy , statistics , neoclassical economics , paleontology , null hypothesis , biology
Abstract According to the Rational Threshold View, a rational agent believes p if and only if her credence in p is equal to or greater than a certain threshold. One of the most serious challenges for this view is the problem of statistical evidence : statistical evidence is often not sufficient to make an outright belief rational, no matter how probable the target proposition is given such evidence. This indicates that rational belief is not as sensitive to statistical evidence as rational credence. The aim of this article is twofold. First, we argue that, in addition to playing a decisive role in rationalizing outright belief, non‐statistical evidence also plays a preponderant role in rationalizing credence. More precisely, when both types of evidence are present in a context, non‐statistical evidence should receive a heavier weight than statistical evidence in determining rational credence. Second, based on this result, we argue that a modified version of the Rational Threshold View can avoid the problem of statistical evidence. We conclude by suggesting a possible explanation of the varying sensitivity to different types of evidence for belief and credence based on the respective aims of these attitudes.