Premium
Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis
Author(s) -
Archer Avery
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/theo.12144
Subject(s) - cognitivism (psychology) , epistemology , criticism , counterexample , belief revision , philosophy , psychology , positive economics , economics , cognition , political science , law , mathematics , neuroscience , discrete mathematics
According to the Strong Belief Thesis (SBT), intending to X entails the belief that one will X . John Brunero has attempted to impugn SBT by arguing that there are cases in which an agent intends to X but is unsure that she will X . Moreover, he claims that the standard reply to such putative counterexamples to SBT – namely, to claim that the unsure agent merely has an intention to try – comes at a high price. Specifically, it prevents SBT from playing the kind of explanatory role the cognitivist requires. This article meets Brunero's challenge to SBT by offering an account of trying and intending to try that not only saves SBT from Brunero's criticism, but does so in a way that preserves the explanatory significance that cognitivists typically take SBT to have.