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Can Indispensability‐Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists?
Author(s) -
Baron Sam
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/theo.12031
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , presentism , epistemology , philosophy , biochemistry , chemistry
In this article I consider what it would take to combine a certain kind of mathematical P latonism with serious presentism. I argue that a Platonist moved to accept the existence of mathematical objects on the basis of an indispensability argument faces a significant challenge if she wishes to accept presentism. This is because, on the one hand, the indispensability argument can be reformulated as a new argument for the existence of past entities and, on the other hand, if one accepts the indispensability argument for mathematical objects then it is hard to resist the analogous argument for the existence of the past.