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Unsharp Sharpness
Author(s) -
Sahlin NilsEric,
Weirich Paul
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/theo.12025
Subject(s) - rationality , indeterminate , face (sociological concept) , fuzzy logic , sociology , epistemology , computer science , mathematical economics , philosophy , mathematics , artificial intelligence , social science , pure mathematics
In a recent, thought‐provoking paper A dam E lga ((2010) argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like L evi's (1980, 1988), G ärdenfors and S ahlin's (1982), and K yburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against E lga's objection.
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