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Safety, Sensitivity and “Distant” Epistemic Luck
Author(s) -
Freitag Wolfgang
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/theo.12011
Subject(s) - luck , closeness , epistemology , similarity (geometry) , sensitivity (control systems) , metaphysics , order (exchange) , philosophy , psychology , computer science , mathematics , artificial intelligence , economics , mathematical analysis , finance , image (mathematics) , electronic engineering , engineering
Prominent instances of anti‐luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in order to qualify as knowledge. Such closeness‐accounts derive much support from their (alleged) ability to eliminate standard instances of epistemic luck as they appear in prominent Gettier‐type examples. The article argues that there are new Gettier‐type examples which are grounded in “distant” epistemic luck. It is demonstrated that sensitivity and safety theories cannot handle such examples.