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A Myth to Kill a Myth? On M c D owell's Interpretation of Sellars' E mpiricism and the P hilosophy of M ind
Author(s) -
Tripodi Paolo
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 16
eISSN - 1755-2567
pISSN - 0040-5825
DOI - 10.1111/theo.12000
Subject(s) - mythology , interpretation (philosophy) , philosophy , inference , epistemology , empiricism , theology , linguistics
According to M c D owell, in E mpiricism and the P hilosophy of M ind the myth of J ones has the purpose of completing the account of experience that Sellars needs to argue against traditional empiricism. In particular, on M c D owell's view the myth of Jones should explain how to conceive of non‐inferentially knowable experiences as containing propositional claims. This article argues that the myth of J ones does not succeed in providing such an account, especially on M c D owell's own terms: assuming M c D owell's epistemological distinction between inferential and non‐inferential knowledge, it turns out that in Sellars' thought experiment perceptual experiences can contain propositional claims only at the price of being known inferentially rather than non‐inferentially. Therefore M c D owell's S ellars' attack fails against traditional empiricism.